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(Mill's tyrannical majority it would seem), might well incline us to hold out
for moral constraints on politics, on law, even if they be of the thick, no
doubt objectionable, Lockean kind.

An Essay on Divine Authority by Mark C. Murphy. Cornell Studies in the
Philosophy of Religion, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2002, 197 pages.
GARY MAR, Department of Philosophy, Stony Brook University
Mark Murphy's An Essay on Divine Authority is a new and original work
in the distinguished Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion edited
by William Alston. The new Problem of Divine Authority is that of (1)
answering whether God has practical authority over created rational
beings, and (2) providing an explanation of the extent of that authority.
Why has this problem been unduly neglected?
Philosophers have failed to see the Problem of Divine Authority, according to Murphy, because they have been blinded by widely held philosophical assumptions. On the one hand, philosophers who assume that "it is a
platitude that God is authoritative" regard the thesis as tautological like
'bachelors are unmarried' and hence trivially true. On the other hand,
philosophers who regard Euthyphro's dilemma as decisive against Divine
Command ethics, assume that the dilemma refutes the Divine authority
thesis. Both assumptions, Murphy argues, are unwarranted. Euthyphro's
dilemma is directed against normative Divine Command theories of ethics
that postulate God's authority as a supreme moral principle; however, the
defender of Divine Authority is not committed to such a view. Moreover,
even the truism 'all bachelors are unmarried' becomes an open question
when regarded as "a de rc question, a question about why these particular
bachelors are unmarried." The Problem of Divine Authority is not so easiIv dismissed.
~ Murphy's examination depends on distinguished between the objective
claim of God's being the supreme authority and the subjective claim of
God's being practically authoritative for me. Practical authority, according to
Murphy's explication, is a relationship in which the dictates of one party
(e.g., God) gives another party (e.g., a creative rational being) a decisive reason for action. The reason for action is a fact that must be complete (it
includes"all that makes an action choiceworthy") and compact (it includes
only those facts that are, at least in part, constitutive of choiceworthiness).
Given the infinity of God's good-making attributes and the finitude of created rational beings, however, one wonders whether the requirement of completeness could be fulfilled in principle, let alone be required for rationality.
Moreover, God's having causal control over an agent's actions does
not imply that God is practically authoritative. For God to be practically
authoritative over an agent, Murphy explains, God's telling agent x to
perform an action cp must "constitutively actualize" a reason for x to cp,
namely, a reason, which if undefeated, is decisive. Explaining just how
God's dictates might constitutively actualize a reason leads Murphy to
articulate three grades of Divine Authority.
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Let 'Cx' abbreviate 'x is a created rational being' and 'Gx' abbreviate
'God has practical authority over x,' which is analyzed as 'for any action qJ,
God's telling x to qJ constitutively actualizes a decisive reason for x to qJ.'
Using this notation, we can succinctly formalize three Strong Authority
Theses (SATs):
Strong Thesis:
Stronger Thesis:
Strongest Thesis:

't;/x(Cx--Gx)

't;/ x(Cx--OGx)

o (x)(Cx--Gx)

The Strong Authority Thesis is the claim that God has universal practical
authority over all created rational beings. The Stronger Thesis says that all
created rational beings are essentially under God's practical authority, and
the Strongest Thesis says it is a necessarily true that all created rational
beings are under God's practical authority. (Note that there are even
stronger theses than Murphy's 'Strongest', e.g., o't;/x(Cx--OGx), or 'it is a
necessary truth that all created rational beings are essentially under God's
practical authority.') It turns out that all three of the SATs fail.
This result is not surprising. The standard modal reading of the
'Stronger Thesis', for example, only requires that all actual creative rational
beings are necessarily under God's practically authority, but leaves it open
whether some possible created rational being need not be under God's practical authority. However, the critical issue is whether God's dictating an
action could, by itself, constitute a decisive reason for a created rational
being to perform that action. Murphy finds this troublesome and so considers a close relative of the strong authority theses. The 'Compliance
Thesis' does not require that God's dictates themselves constitute reasons
for compliance, but only that God has some reasons and hence that created
rational beings are acting irrationally if they fail to comply with God's dictates. This substitute thesis, Murphy argues, captures what is plausible
about the SATs without the implication that God's authoritativeness decisively demands compliance just because God so dictates.
In subsequent chapters, Murphy argues that Perfect Being Theology
gives us no reason to affirm the SATs, that neither metaethical nor normative Divine Command ethics gives us any reason to hold the SATs, and
that there are no convincing moral arguments for the SATs. With regard to
Orthodox Christianity, none of the scriptural truths that God is worthy of
worship, that God is King over Israel, or that God is sovereign over all creation requires the SATs. Murphy, moreover, is not satisfied to recommend
skepticism: he claims that rationalism demands that "we ought not merely
to withhold belief in any of the authority theses; we ought, rather, to disbelieve them."
While admiring the intellectual virtuosity of the Murphy's analyses,
readers may find Murphy's solution to the Problem of Divine Authority
disingenuous. Murphy admits that while God has authority over all creation "loosely speaking", God "strictly speaking" does not have authority
over all created rational beings, but only those human beings who have
submitted themselves to divine authority and "to make God authoritative
over him or over her." Here Murphy concedes, "I am proceeding largely
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on the basis of an argument from ignorance, I do not know of any way for
us to come under divine authority except through submission to divine
rule, and I am proceeding on the assumption there are no other ways."
Murphy gives two specifically Christian applications of his solution.
Murphy endorses a natural law approach to ethics and explains in detail
why the arguments of Grisez and Finnis, the foremost advocates of natural
law, fail to show the intrinsic immorality of homosexual conduct.
Murphy's solution is that, on the basis of God's authoritativeness, the
Christian can rationally affirm that homosexual conduct is categorically
wrong even without having the support of natural law. Murphy also says
rus solution explains why Christians, but not non-Christians, are bound to
God's command to "love thy neighbor". Having submitted themselves to
God's authority, "Christians are ... under a weighty moral burden that
persons generally are not, one that requires them to sacrifice their own
good in ways that most of us would not choose to sacrifice if it were up to
us." Scripture's more winsome portrayal is that believers are transformed
into a "new creation" (2 Cor. 5:5) with a "ministry of reconciliation" (v. 18)
that is an outworking of God's purpose of "reconciling the world to himself in Christ" (v. 19). Jesus' command "take my yoke upon you ...
[because] my yoke is easy and my burden is light" rughlights the contrast
between Murphy's non-authoritative abstract conception of divine dictates
with the incamational authoritativeness of God's revealed Word.
Identifying himself as a Roman Catholic, Murphy nevertheless claims
that his general arguments about Divine authority "do not appeal to claims
about God that are affirmed by Christianity but denied by either of the
other Abramic faiths" and "could easily be addressed to those whose conception of God is that of Judaism or Islam as to those who conception is
that of Christianity." Could Murphy be mistaken in assuming that nothing
is lost in reasoning about the monotheistic concept of the God of Abraham,
Jesus, and Mohammed?
Recall that Murphy argued that even the truism that all bachelors are
unmarried' is an open question when considered a de re question.
Similarly, de re truths about God opens up possibilities not available to
purely de dicta reasoning about the God of philosophical theism. Even if
one could create counterexamples to support the claim that the concept of
God does not imply that God is practically authoritative over created rational beings, this would not preclude that God is authoritative. One could
argue by analogy, for example, that godly parents (objectively) have authority over their children even if the children are too young (subjectively) to
articulate their reasons for obeying the dictates of their parents. Similarly,
why couldn't God in fact be authoritative (objectively) whether or not, created rational beings could (subjectively) articulate a complete, compact, and
constitutively actualizing reason for obedience? Such considerations might
lead one to criticize Murphy's treatment of the Problem of Divine
Authority as too subjective.
Although this marks a contemplative tum, I want to suggest on the contrary, that contemporary analytic philosophy of religion may suffer from a
poverty of subjectivity-the failure to articulate in their analyses the authoritative dimensions of religious experience. Thomas Merton wisely
I
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observed, "[T]he subjectivity essential to love does not detract from objective reality but adds to it. Love brings us into relationship with an objectively existing reality, but because it is love it is able to bridge the gap
between subject and object and commune in the subjectivity of the one loved.
Only love can effect this kind of union and give this kind of knowledgeby-identity with the beloved .... " ("The Power and Meaning of Love," in
Disputed Questions, Farrar, Straus and Giroux: NY, 1976, p. 103.)
Murphy's book is an original and rigorous exercise in articulating a
newly defined Problem of Divine Authority. If contemporary analytic
philosophers of religion are to make progress on this important problem, perhaps in addition to delighting in the deployment of the technology of logical and modal reasoning, we need also to consider exploring,
more contemplatively, the compelling and authoritative dimensions of
loving God.

Metapher und Lebenswelt Hans Blumenbergs Metaphorologie als
Lebenswelthermeneutik und ihr religionsphiinomenologischer Horizont, by
Philipp Stoellger. Tubingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2000. XVI + 583 pp.
99.00 Euros.
DOUGLAS HEDLEY, Clare College, Cambridge University
This rich and learned book is not for the faint hearted. It contains 583 pages
of densely (but beautifully) printed reflection upon the thought of German
philosopher Hans Blumenberg'S theological sources and theological relevance. It is well worth the effort--one can glean many insights and profit
from the immense learning of this book: a splendid attempt to analyse the
philosophical significance of one of the most interesting twentieth century
German philosophers, Hans Blumenberg. Blumenberg has stimulated
much discussion on particular issues, but this is an attempt to interpret his
CEuvre as a whole and to reflect upon its theological ramifications.
Stoellger's thesis is that theology deals with the metaphors of religious language, and Blumenberg can help articulate the theological project.
Stoellger's choice is prima facie surprising. Blumenberg was not a theologian and in many ways as a philosopher he was, though not hostile to
Christianity, convinced that modem culture and philosophy ought to extricate and emanicipate itself from the Christian legacy-as indeed the title of
his most famous work, The Legitimacy of Modernity, suggests. Stoellger,
however, endeavours to demonstrate that Blumenberg is a rich resource
for theology in moving away from a 'Logik des Begriffs,' i.e., a rigidly conceptual logic, to a Metaphorologie', i.e. a logic of metaphors within a
hermeneutical phenomenology of the experienced world.
Stoellger's fine book is a detailed analysis of the major works of
Blumenberg from his early theological work to his final work on Bach's St.
Matthew Passion. We also find detailed and illuminating discussions of
Vico, Ricoeur, Derrida and Jungel, as well as Hick and Aristotle. Stoellger's
discussion of metaphor and symbol is incisive and informed by a striking

